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Abstract. In this paper we study social exclusion in social (informa-
tion) networks using a game-theoretic approach, and study the stability
of a certain class community structures that are a Nash equilibrium. The
main result of our analysis shows that all stable community structures
(Nash equilibria) in this class are community structures under which
some agents are socially excluded, and do not belong to any of the com-
munities. This result is quite striking as it suggests that social exclusion
might be the “norm” (an expected outcome) in social networks, rather
than an anomaly.
1 Introduction
Social exclusion has been recognized as an important aspect in understanding
social networks [8]. Roughly, social exclusion can be characterized by a distri-
bution of goods and services that excludes certain (groups of) individuals from
having any access at all to these goods and services. Or the goods and services
that they have access to do not match their needs and as such do not provide
any “benefit’. Two key questions for understanding social exclusion are a) “what
is the process that leads to social exclusion?”, and b) “what (social) policies can
be put in place in order to re-integrate excluded (marginalized) individuals back
into a community (society)?”. In this paper we focus on the first question and
study the process that leads to social exclusion. While concentrating on this
question, we believe that the models and insights into the process of how so-
cial exclusion occurs can potentially also be used to analyze and design (social)
policies to counteract social exclusion.
The question of how social exclusion occurs has been studied in the literature
where the focus has been on studying “who is doing the excluding?” [1]. In this
paper we take a different approach and rather than focusing on the question
“who is doing the exclusion”, we study whether social exclusion might be in
fact a structural property of communities in social networks. To do this, we use
a game-theoretic approach to model the interaction among agents in a social
network that has been studied by Carrington and Marbach [5]. Using this game-
theoretic framework, we study a) which community structures (Nash equilibria)
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that emerge in a social network are stable, and b) whether there exist stable
community structures under which some agents are excluded (marginalized) and
do not belong to any community.
The key result that we obtain through our analysis is that the only com-
munity structures (Nash equilibria) that are stable are community structures
with social exclusion. That is, the only community structures that are stable are
structures under which some agents are marginalized and do not belong to any
community. This is a striking result that suggests that social exclusion is indeed
a “reality” (inevitable) in social networks. In this sense, the results obtained by
our analysis suggest a new, and fundamentally different, understanding of social
exclusion. That is rather than focusing on the question “who is doing the exclu-
sion”, one should focus on how do we deal (as a society) with social exclusion
as a systematic property of social networks? We discuss this in more details in
Section 6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we describe the
model we adopt to study community networks. In Section 4 we introduce the
perturbation model that we use to study the stability of Nash equilibria. In
Section 5 we present our main results.
2 Related Work
Studying social exclusion has received considerable attention in economic, so-
cial and health sciences; we refer to [8] for an overview of this vast literature.
However studying social exclusion using a formal, model-based approach, has
obtained much less attention. The only existing literature that uses a formal
model-based approach to study social exclusion that we are aware of is the pa-
per by Carrington and Marbach [5].
Using a game-theoretic approach, the research in [5] formally studies whether
in social (information) networks there exist Nash equilibria under which some
agents are marginalized, and not included in any of the communities. To do
that, the work in [5] considers a particular type of social networks where agents
(individuals) share/exchange information. Each agent chooses to join communi-
ties that maximizes its own utility obtained from content obtained, and shared,
within the community. The analysis in [5] shows that there exists a class of
Nash equilibria for the resulting game under which some agents are excluded
(marginalized) from the community structure, i.e. they do not belong to (join)
any of the communities. The reason for this is that these agents would have a
negative utility in all of the communities that exist in the Nash equilibrium.
These agents then have the choice to either join a community where the utility
they receive is negative, or not join any community at all (and obtain a utility
of zero). In this situation agents are better off not joining any community, and
they become marginalized.
While the analysis in [5] shows that Nash equilibria with marginalized agents
do exist, it does not address the question whether these Nash equilibria are
indeed likely to occur and persist in a social network. Note that communities in
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social network constantly change (are perturbed) as some agents leave, and other
agents join, the community. For this situation, we are interested in studying
whether a Nash equilibrium is stable in the sense that it is robust to small
changes (perturbations). Stable Nash equilibria are likely to persist and hence
to be observed in social networks. On the other hand, Nash equilibria that are
not stable will eventually vanish, and as a result are not likely to occur. In
the following we are interested in whether Nash equilibria with marginalized
agents are robust to perturbations, and hence likely to occur and persist in
social networks.
In our analysis we use the concept of a stable Nash equilibrium that we for-
mally define in Section 4. Roughly, we define a stable Nash equilibrium as a
Nash equilibrium that is robust to (local) perturbations. There is an extensive
literature in game-theory that studies the properties of Nash equilibria under
perturbations. These perturbations could either be perturbations to the agents’
value function, or to the agents’ (players’) strategies [9,2]. The approach that
we consider is most closely related to stochastic fictitious play [6,7,4] where each
player’s payoffs are perturbed in each period by random shocks. The conver-
gence results of stochastic fictitious play has been analyzed for games with an
interior evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), zero sum games, potential games,
near potential games and supermodular games. These results are obtained using
techniques from stochastic approximation theory that show that one can char-
acterize the perturbed best response dynamic of stochastic fictitious games by
a differential equation defined by the expected motion of the stochastic process.
We use the same approach in this paper where we model the perturbed best
response dynamics of the agents by a differential equation as given in Section 4.
3 Background
In this section we describe the model and results of [5] that we use for our
analysis. The model considers the situation where agents produce (generate)
and consume (obtain) content in a social (information) network. Agents can
form communities in order to share/exchange content more efficiently, and ob-
tain a certain utility from joining a given community. Using a game-theoretic
framework, the community structure that emerges is characterized by a Nash
equilibrium.
More precisely, the model in [5] is given as follows. Assume that each content
item that is being produced in the social (information) network can be associated
with a particular topic, or content type. Furthermore assume that there exists
a structure that relates different content topics with each other. In particular,
assume there exists a measure of “closeness” between content topics that charac-
terizes how strongly related two content topics are. To model this situation, the
topic of a content item is given by a point x in a metric space, and the closeness
between two content topics x, x′ ∈ M is then given by the distance measure
d(x, x′), x, x′ ∈M, for the metric space M.
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The set of agents in the network, and agents’ interests as well as agents’
ability to produce content are then given as follows. Assume that there is a set
Ad of agents that consume content, and a set As of agents that produce content,
where the subscripts stand for “demand" and “supply”. Furthermore, associate
with each agent that consumes content a center of interest y ∈M, i.e. the center
of interest y of an agent is the topic that the agent is most interested in. The
interest in content topic x of an agent with center of interest y is given by
p(x|y) = f(d(x, y)), x, y ∈M, (1)
where d(x, y) is the distance between the center of interest y and topic x, and
f : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] is a non-increasing function. The interpretation of the function
p(x|y) is as follows: when an agent with center of interest y consumes (reads)
a content item on topic x, then it finds it interesting with probability p(x|y) as
given by Eq. (1). As the function f is non-increasing, this model captures the
intuition that the agent is more interested in topics that are close to its center
of interest y.
Similarly, given an agent that produces content, the center of interest y of
the agent is the topic for which the agent is most adept at producing content.
The ability of the agent to produce content on topic x ∈M is given by
q(x|y) = g(d(x, y)), (2)
where g : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] is a non-increasing function.
In the following we identify an agent by its center of interest y ∈ M, i.e.
agent y is the agent with center of interest y. As a result we have that Ad ⊆M
and As ⊆M.
3.1 Community C = (Cd, Cs)
A community C = (Cd, Cs) consists of a set of agents that consume content
Cd ⊆ Ad and a set of agents that produce content Cs ⊆ As. Let βC(x|y) be the
rate at which agent y ∈ Cs generates content items on topic x in community
C. Let αC(y) be the fraction of content produced in community C that agent
y ∈ Cd consumes. To define the utility for content consumption and production,
assume that when an agent consumes a single content item, it receives a reward
equal to 1 if the content item is of interest and relevant, and pays a cost of
c > 0 for consuming the item. The cost c captures the cost in time (energy) to
read/consume a content item. Using this reward and cost structure, the utility
rate (“reward minus cost") for content consumption of agent y ∈ Cd is given by
U
(d)
C (y) = αC(y)
∫
x∈M
[
QC(x)p(x|y) − βC(x)c
]
dx,
where
QC(x) =
∫
y∈Cs
βC(x|y)q(x|y)dy, and βC(x) =
∫
y∈Cs
βC(x|y)dy.
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Similarly, the utility rate for content production of agent y ∈ Cs is given by
U
(s)
C (y) =
∫
x∈M
βC(x|y)
[
q(x|y)PC(x)− αCc
]
dx,
where
PC(x) =
∫
y∈Cd
αC(y)p(x|y)dy, and αC =
∫
z∈Cd
αC(z)dz.
The utility rate for content production captures how “valuable” the content pro-
duced by agent y is for the set of content consuming agents Cd in the community
C [5].
3.2 Community Structure and Nash Equilibrium
A community structure defines how agents organize themselves into communi-
ties, where in each community agents produce and consume content as described
in the previous subsection.
A community structure is given by a triplet (C, {αC(y)}y∈Ad , {βC(·|y)}y∈As),
where C is the set of communities C that exist in the structure, and
αC(y) = {αC(y)}C∈C, y ∈ Ad, and βC(·|y) = {βC(·|y)}C∈C , y ∈ As,
are the consumption fractions and production rates, respectively, that agents
allocate to the different communities C ∈ C.
Assume that the total consumption fractions and production rates of each
agent are bounded by 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq > 0, respectively, i.e. we have that
‖αC(y)‖ =
∑
C∈C
αC(y) ≤ Ep, y ∈ Ad, and ‖βC(y)‖ =
∑
C∈C
‖βC(·|y)‖ ≤ Eq, y ∈ As,
where ‖βC(·|y)‖ =
∫
x∈M βC(x|y)dx.
To analyze the interaction among agents, assume that agents join communi-
ties in order to maximize their own utility rates. That is, agents join communi-
ties, and choose allocations αC(y) and βC(·|y), in order to maximize their own
consumption, and production utility rates, respectively.
A Nash equilibrium is then given by a community structure
(C∗, {α∗C(y)}y∈Ad , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈As) such that for all agents y ∈ Ad we have that
α∗C(y) = argmax
αC(y):‖αC(y)‖≤Ep
∑
C∈C
U
(d)
C (y),
and for all agents y ∈ As, we have that
β∗C(·|y) = argmax
βC(·|y):‖βC(y)‖≤Eq
∑
C∈C
U
(s)
C (y).
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3.3 Community Structure C(LC, ld)
The above model was analyzed in [5] for the case of a specific metric space, and
a specific family of information communities. More precisely, the analysis in [5]
considers the one-dimensional metric space given by an interval R = [−L,L) ⊂
R, L > 0, with the torus metric, i.e. the distance between two points x, y ∈ R is
given by
d(x, y) = ||x− y|| = min{|x− y|, 2L− |x− y|},
where |x| is the absolute value of x ∈ R. The metric space R with the torus
metric is the simplest (non-trivial) one-dimensional metric space for the analysis
of community structures in information networks. The reason for this is that
the torus metric is “symmetric” and does not have any “border effects”, which
simplifies the analysis.
Furthermore, the analysis in [5] assumes that Ad = As = R, i.e. for each
content topic x ∈ R there exists an agent in Ad who is most interested in content
of type x, and there exists an agent in As who is most adept at producing content
of type x.
In addition, the analysis in [5] considers a particular family of community
structures C(LC , ld), LC > 0 and 0 < ld ≤ LC , given as follows.
Let N ≥ 2 be a given integer. Furthermore, let LC =
L
N
, where L is the half-
length of the metric space R = [−L,L), and let ld be such that 0 < ld ≤ LC .
Finally, let {mk}
N
k=1 be a set of N evenly spaced points on the metric space
R = [−L,L) given by mk+1 = m1 + 2LCk, k = 1, ..., N − 1.
Given LC , ld, and mk, k = 1, ..., N , as defined above, the set of communities
C = {Ck = (Ckd , C
k
s )}
N
k=1 of the structure C(LC , ld) is then given by the intervals
Ckd = [mk − ld,mk + ld) and C
k
s = [mk − LC ,mk + LC).
Furthermore, the allocations {αC(y)}y∈R and {βC(·|y)}y∈R of the community
structure C(LC , ld) are given by
αCk(y) =
{
Ep y ∈ C
k
d
0 otherwise
, k = 1, ..., N, (3)
and
βCk(·|y) =
{
Eqδ(x − x
∗(y)) y ∈ Cks
0 otherwise
, k = 1, ..., N, (4)
where
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCk(x).
Note that for ld = LC , the community structure C(LC , ld) = C(LC , LC),
and all agents belong to at least one community in C(LC , LC). On the other
hand if we have that ld < LC then community structure has “gaps”, and there
are agents that do not belong to any community. In particular, the content
consuming agents in the sets
Dk = [mk + ld,mk+1 − ld), k = 1, ..., N − 1,
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and DN = [mN+ ld,m1− ld), do not belong to any community in C(LC , ld). This
means that these agents are marginalized, and excluded from the community
structure.
3.4 Nash Equilibria C(L∗
C
, l∗
d
)
To analyze the existence of Nash equilibria within the family C(LC , ld) of com-
munity structures as defined in the previous section, [5] made the following
assumptions for the functions f and g that are used in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2).
Assumption 1 The function f : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] is given by f(x) = max{0, f0−
ax}, where f0 ∈ (0, 1] and a > 0. The function g : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] is given by
g(x) = g0, where g0 ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore, we have that f0g0 > c.
The condition in Assumption 1 that f0g0 > c is a necessary condition for a Nash
equilibrium to exist, i.e. if this condition is not true, then there does not exist
a Nash equilibrium [5]. Under the above assumptions, the following two results
regarding the existence, and properties of, Nash equilibria within the family
C(LC , ld) of community structures were obtained in [5].
The first result states that there always exists a Nash equilibrium with ld =
LC within the family C(LC , ld) of community structures as defined above.
Proposition 3.1. Let the functions f and g be as given in Assumption 1. Then
the community structure C(L∗C , L
∗
C) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
L∗C ≤
f0
a
−
c
ag0
.
Proposition 3.1 states that there always exists a Nash equilibrium under
which no agents are marginalized.
The next result provides characterization of a Nash equilibrium with marginal-
ized agents.
Proposition 3.2. Let the functions f and g be as given in Assumption 1. Then
the community structure C(L∗C , l
∗
d) with
0 < l∗d < L
∗
C , and L
∗
C =
L
N
where N ≥ 2 is an integer, is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
l∗d =
f0
a
−
c
ag0
.
Note that Proposition 3.2 that there always exists a community structure C(L∗C , l
∗
d)
that is a Nash equilibrium with marginalized agents if we have that
L > 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
i.e. if the content space (−L,L] is large enough.
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4 Stable and Neutral-Stable Nash Equilibria C(L∗
C
, l∗
d
)
The results from [5] presented in the previous section show that there always
exists a Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d = L
∗
C) under which no agents are marginal-
ized. Furthermore, it shows that if the content space (−L,L] is large enough
then there always exists a Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d), 0 < l
∗
d < L
∗
C under which
some agents are marginalized.
The goal of this paper is to characterize which of the Nash equilibria C(L∗C , l
∗
d)
obtained in the previous section are stable, i.e. robust to small perturbations to
the community structure. This question is motivated by the following observa-
tion. As over time agents may join, or leave, communities in a social network,
community structure is not static but changes over time. For this situation, we
are interested in studying whether a community structure is stable in the sense
that it is robust to small changes (perturbations) to the structure.
In order to study this question, we use the following approach. For a given
Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d), we consider two adjacent communities C
1 = (C1d , C
1
s )
and C2 = (C2d , C
2
s ). Without loss of generality we assume that the two commu-
nities are given by
C1d = [−LC − l
∗
d,−LC + l
∗
d) (5)
and
C2d = [LC − l
∗
d, LC + l
∗
d), (6)
as well as
C1s = [−2LC , 0) (7)
and
C2s = [0, 2LC). (8)
Note that by the definition of the community structure C(LC , l
∗
d) given in Sec-
tion 4, there always exist at least two communities in a Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d).
We then perturb the “boundary” between the two communities by a small
amount, and study the dynamics of the boundaries between the two communities
after this perturbation. In particular we study whether over time the perturba-
tion vanishes and the original community structure is again obtained. If the
perturbation vanishes over time, then this suggests that the Nash equilibrium is
stable in the sense that the Nash equilibrium is resistant to (local) perturbations.
On the other hand if the communities are no restored after the perturbation,
then this suggests that the Nash equilibrium is not stable.
More precisely, we consider the following perturbation model to study the
stability of a Nash equilibrium. For t = 0 we set
C1d(t = 0) = [−LC − l
∗
d,−LC + l
∗
d + δdl(0))
and
C2d(t = 0) = [LC − l
∗
d + δdr(0), LC + l
∗
d),
as well as
C1s (t = 0) = [−2LC , δsl(0)) and C
2
s (t = 0) = [δsr(0), 2LC),
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where
δdl(0) = δdr(0), if l
∗
d = LC
and
δdl(0) < 2LC − 2l
∗
d + δdr(0), if l
∗
d < LC ,
as well as δsl(0) = δsr(0).
We analyze the dynamics of the boundaries between the two communities
after the initial perturbation, i.e. we characterize the trajectory of the pertur-
bation δdl(t), δdr(t), δsl(t), and δsr(t), over time t ≥ 0. The intuition behind the
dynamics of the boundaries is as follows. Note that the community boundaries
represent the agents at the border between the two communities. We refer to
these agents as the border agents. We then assume that a border agent will join
the community which provides the highest utility, given that the highest utility
is non-negative. If the highest utility is negative, then the border agent will leave
the community and not join any community (and obtain a utility equal to 0).
Using this intuition, we then assume that the rate at which the boundaries
move is given by the difference between the utilities in the two communities.
That is, the higher the difference of the two utilities, the higher the rate (the
faster) with which border agents move from one community to the other. The
corresponding differential equations for the dynamics of the boundaries for t ≥ 0
are then given by
dδdl(t)
dt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δdl(t)) −max
{
0, U
(d)
C2(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δdl(t))
}
(9)
and
dδdr(t)
dt
= max
{
0, U
(d)
C1(t)
(LC − l
∗
d + δdr(t))
}
− U
(d)
C2(t)
(LC − l
∗
d + δdr(t)) (10)
Similarly, we have that
dδsl(t)
dt
= U
(s)
C1(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δsl(t))−max
{
0, U
(s)
C2(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δsl(t))
}
(11)
and
dδsr(t)
dt
= max
{
0, U
(s)
C1(t)
(LC − l
∗
d + δsr(t))
}
− U
(s)
C2(t)
(LC − l
∗
d + δsr(t)). (12)
Note that in the above differential equation the border agent will never move
to a community that provides a negative utility.
Using this model, we say that the Nash equilibrium is stable if the following
is true.
Definition 4.1. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a given Nash equilibrium, and let C1 = (C
1
d , C
1
s )
and C2 = (C
2
d , C
2
s ) be two communities in C(L
∗
C , l
∗
d) as given by Eq. (5) - (8).
We say that the Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) is stable if there exists a δ > 0
such that for
0 < δdl(t = 0), δdr(t = 0), δsl(t = 0), δsr(t = 0) ≤ δ
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we have for the differential equations given by Eq. (9) - (12) that
0 ≤ δdl(t), δdr(t), δsl(t), δsr(t) ≤ δ, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δdl(t) = lim
t→∞
δdr(t) = lim
t→∞
δsl(t) = lim
t→∞
δsr(t) = 0.
This definition captures the intuition that under a stable Nash equilibrium we
have that small perturbations to the community boundaries will vanish (become
equal to 0) over time.
In addition, we use a weaker notion of stability to which we refer to as a
neutral-stable Nash equilibrium. To define a neutral-stable Nash equilibrium,
we use the following notation.
Let C1(t) = (C
1
d(t), C
1
s (t)) and C2(t) = (C
2
d(t), C
2
s (t)), be the structure of
two communities under the above perturbation model at time t. For an agent
y ∈ C1s (t) ∪ C
2
s (t), let
x∗1(y, t) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)
∫
z∈C1
d
(t)
p(x|z)dz
be the optimal content for agent y to produce in community C1(t), and let
x∗2(y, t) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)
∫
z∈C2
d
(t)
p(x|z)dz
be the optimal content for agent y to produce in community C2(t). Using this
definition, let the utilities of agents y ∈ C1d(t) ∪C
2
d(t) be given as follows,
U
(d)
C1(t)
(y) = EpEq
∫
z∈C1s (t)
[
q(x∗1(z, t)|z)p(x
∗
1(z, t)|y)− c
]
dz
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(y) = EpEq
∫
z∈C2s (t)
[
q(x∗2(z, t)|z)p(x
∗
2(z, t)|y)− c
]
dz.
Similarly, let the utilities of agents y ∈ C1s (t) ∪ C
2
s (t) be given as follows,
U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) = EpEq
∫
z∈C1
d
(t)
[
q(x∗1(y, t)|y)p(x
∗
1(y, t)|z)− c
]
dz
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) = EpEq
∫
z∈C2
d
(t)
[
q(x∗2(y, t)|y)p(x
∗
2(y, t)|z)− c
]
dz.
Definition 4.2. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a given Nash equilibrium, and let C1 = (C
1
d , C
1
s )
and C2 = (C
2
d , C
2
s ) be two communities in C(L
∗
C , l
∗
d) as given by Eq. (5) - (8). We
say that the Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) is neutral-stable if one of the following
is true for the differential equations given by Eq. (9) - (12).
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1. There exists a δ > 0 such that for
0 < δdl(t = 0), δdr(t = 0), δsl(t = 0), δsr(t = 0) ≤ δ
we have
0 ≤ δdl(t), δdr(t) ≤ δ, t ≥ 0, and lim
t→∞
δdl(t) = lim
t→∞
δdr(t) = 0,
as well as
lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) = lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) > 0, y ∈ C1s ∪ C
2
s .
2. There exists a δ > 0 such that for
0 < δdl(t = 0), δdr(t = 0), δsl(t = 0), δsr(t = 0) ≤ δ
we have
0 ≤ δsl(t), δsr(t) ≤ δ, t ≥ 0, and lim
t→∞
δsl(t) = lim
t→∞
δsr(t) = 0,
as well as
lim
t→∞
U
(d)
C1(t)
(y) = lim
t→∞
U
(d)
C2(t)
(y) > 0, y ∈ C1d ∪ C
2
d .
This definition captures the case where either the content producers, or content
consumers, are neutral (indifferent) regarding which community to join as they
obtain the same utility rate in both communities.
5 Results
We obtain the following results for the perturbation model of Section 4. The
first result states that (almost) all Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d = L
∗
C) as given by
Proposition 3.1 under which no agents are marginalized, are not stable.
Proposition 5.1. All Nash equilibria C(L∗C , l
∗
d = L
∗
C) with L
∗
C <
(
f0
a
− c
ag0
)
are neither stable nor neutral-stable.
We provide a proof of Proposition 5.1 in Appendix 5.1.
The next result states that all Nash equilibria C(L∗C , l
∗
d) as given by Propo-
sition 3.2 under which some agents are marginalized, are neutral-stable.
Proposition 5.2. All Nash equilibria C(L∗C , l
∗
d) with l
∗
d =
(
f0
a
− c
ag0
)
< L∗C as
given by Proposition 3.2 are neutral-stable.
We provide a proof of Proposition 5.1 in Appendix 5.2.
The above results state that Nash equilibria with marginalized agents are
(neutral) stable, but (almost) all Nash equilibria with no marginalized agents
are not stable.
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6 Conclusions
We have studied social exclusion in social networks using a game-theoretic frame-
work. In particular, we asked and analyzed the question whether social exclusion
might be a structural property of communities in social networks. The results
obtained under the model considered in this paper show that all (neutral) stable
Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria with social exclusion. This is quite a striking
result as it suggests that having marginalized individuals (i.e. social exclusion)
is the “norm” in social networks, rather than an anomaly or exception. In this
sense, the obtained results provide a new understanding of social exclusion, where
rather than asking “who is doing the exclusion” the correct question to ask is
how do we deal with social exclusion as a systematic property of social networks
(society)?
We note that the results in this paper were obtained under a particular game-
theoretic model. In that sense, rather than providing a definite “proof” that
having marginalized individuals (i.e. social exclusion) is the “norm” in social
networks, rather than an anomaly or exception, the results that we obtain is
a first evidence that suggests that this might be the case. Given the potential
impact and implications of this result in our understanding of social exclusion,
important and interesting follow-up research is to verify whether these results a)
are true under more general models than the one considered in this paper, and b)
can be verified/observed in real-life case studies? We discuss possible directions
to study these two research questions in more details below.
The results obtained in this paper were for a particular case where the func-
tions f and g are as given by Assumption 1. A natural question to ask is whether
these results extend to more general functions f and g. An extension of the formal
analysis to more general functions f and g seems challenging and it is not clear
whether it can be done. As a result, one might need to resort to numerical case
studies to investigate this question. We carried out such numerical case studies
for more general functions, and the initial results that we obtained suggest that
the results indeed carry over to more general settings.
An interesting and important aspect of the results obtained in this paper
is whether they indeed provide the correct insight into the process of how so-
cial exclusion occurs in real-life social networks and communities. One potential
avenue for exploring this question could be using the effect of globalization on
social exclusion. This topic has been extensively studied and documented [8]. In
particular, the work by Beall [3] provides a concrete study of the influence of
globalization on local communities in Pakistan and South Africa. An interesting
question is whether the empirical results in [3] could be explained by, and match,
the model-based results obtained in this paper.
Finally, an interesting direction for future research is to study whether the
models used for the analysis in this paper could be used to design (social) policies
to re-integrate marginalized individuals into a community/society.
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A Properties of the Utilities for the Communities C1(t)
and C2(t)
In this appendix we provide additional properties of a Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d)
as given by Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2, as well as the utility functions
of agents in the communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, as defined in Section 4.
Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.1 and Propo-
sition 3.2, and let C = (Cd, Cs) be a community under this Nash equilibrium.
From Section 3 we then have that the consumption utility of an agent y ∈ Cd is
given by
U
(d)
C (y) = EpEq
∫
z∈Cs
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)dz − EpEqc
∫
z∈Cs
dz (13)
and the production utility of an agent y ∈ Cs is given by
U
(s)
C (y) = EpEqq(x
∗(y)|y)
∫
z∈Cd
p(x∗(y)|z)dz − EqEqc
∫
z∈Cd
dz, (14)
where
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)
∫
z∈Cd
p(x|z)dz.
The following result from [5] characterizes the content x∗(y) that an agent
y produces under a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.1 and Proposi-
tion 3.2.
Lemma A.1. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.1
and Proposition 3.2, and let C = (Cd, Cs) given by
Cd = [y0 − l
∗
d, y0 + l
∗
d)
and
Cs = [y0 − L
∗
C , y0 + L
∗
C),
be a community under this Nash equilibrium. Then we have for agent y ∈ Cs
that
x∗(y) = y0 = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)
∫
z∈Cd
p(x|z)dz.
Lemma A.1 states that it is optimal for an agent y ∈ Cs to produce content at
the center of interest y0 of the agent set Cd. Using the same argument as given
in in [5] to prove Lemma A.1, we obtain the following result.
Lemma A.2. Let
C1d(t) = [−L
∗
C − l
∗
d,−L
∗
C + l
∗
d + δdl(t))
and
C2d(t) = [L
∗
C − l
∗
d + δdr(t), L
∗
C + l
∗
d),
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as well as
C1s (t) = [−2L
∗
C , δsl(t))
and
C2s (t) = [δsr(t), 2L
∗
C),
be the structure of the two communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, as defined
in Section 4. The optimal content x∗1(y) that agent y ∈ C
1
s ∪ C
2
s produces in
community C1(t) is given by
x∗1(y) = −L
∗
C +
δdl(t)
2
= argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)
∫
z∈C1
d
(t)
p(x|z)dx,
and the optimal content x∗2(y) that agent y ∈ C
1
s ∪ C
2
s produces in community
C2(t) is given by
x∗2(y) = L
∗
C +
δdr(t)
2
= argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)
∫
z∈C2
d
(t)
p(x|z)dx.
Using the result of Lemma A.2, we obtain the following result that charac-
terizes the utility that agents y ∈ C1d(t) receive in community C1(t).
Lemma A.3. Let the community C1(t), t ≥ 0, given by
C1d(t) = [−L
∗
C − l
∗
d,−L
∗
C + l
∗
d + δdl(t))
and
C1s (t) = [−2L
∗
C , δsl(t))
as defined in Section 4. If at time t ≥ 0 we have that
δsl(t) > −2L
∗
C,
then the following is true.
a) If
0 < 2l∗d + δdl(t) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δdl(t)) > 0.
b) If
0 < 2l∗d + δdl(t) = 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
then we have that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δdl(t)) = 0.
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c) If
2l∗d + δdl(t) > 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δdl(t)) < 0.
Similarly, we obtain the following result that characterizes the utility that
agents y ∈ C2d(t) receive in community C2(t).
Lemma A.4. Let the community Cw(t), t ≥ 0, given by
C2d(t) = [L
∗
C − l
∗
d + δdr(t), L
∗
C + l
∗
d)
and
C2s (t) = [δsr(t), 2L
∗
C)
be as defined in Section 4. If at time t ≥ 0 we have that
δsr(t) < 2L
∗
C ,
then the following is true:
c) If
0 < 2l∗d − δdr(t) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δdr(t)) > 0.
c) If
0 < 2l∗d − δdr(t) = 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
then we have that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δdr(t)) = 0.
c) If
2l∗d − δdr(t) > 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δdr(t)) < 0.
The above results follow immediately from Lemma A.2 that characterizes the
optimal content that agents produce for the case where the function f and g are
as given by Assumption 1 and we have
f(x) = max{0, f0 − ax}
and
g(x) = g0,
where g0 ∈ (0, 1], and the definition of the utility functions as given in Section 4.
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B Properties of the Perturbation Functions
In this appendix we derive properties of the perturbation functions δl,1(t), δl,2(t),
δs,1(t), δs,2(t) defined by Eq. (9) - Eq. (12) in Section 4. Our first result shows
that the perturbation functions are given by continuous functions.
Lemma B.1. Let the communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, and perturbation
functions δl,1(t), δl,2(t), δs,1(t), δs,2(t) be as defined in Section 4. Then the per-
turbation functions δl,1(t), δl,2(t), δs,1(t), δs,2(t) are continuous in t for t ≥ 0.
Proof. Using Lemma A.2, the utility U
(d)
C1(t)
(y), y ∈ R, t ≥ 0, is given by
U
(d)
C1(t)
(y) = EpEq(2L
∗
C + δs,1(t))
[
g0max
{
0, f0 − a
∣∣∣−2L∗C + δl,1(t)
2
− y
∣∣∣}− c] .
Note that
|2L∗C + δs,1(t)| ≤ 2L,
ad it follows that∣∣∣U (d)C1(t)(y)
∣∣∣ ≤ EpEq(2L)max{c, g0a0}, y ∈ R.
Using the same argument, we have for y ∈ R and t ≥ 0 that∣∣∣U (d)C1(t)(y)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣U (s)C1(t)(y)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣U (d)C2(t)(y)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣U (s)C2(t)(y)
∣∣∣ ≤ EpEq(2L)max{c, g0a0}.
It then follows from definition of the perturbation functions δl,1(t), δl,2(t), δs,1(t),
δs,2(t) given by Eq. (9) - Eq. (12) that they are continuous in t for t ≥ 0.
Our next result characterizes the dynamics of the perturbations δl,1(t) and
δl,2(t).
Lemma B.2. Let the communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. If we have that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
U
(d)
C1(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
dδl,1(t)
dt
=
dδl,2(t)
dt
, t ≥ 0.
and
δl,1(t) = δl,2(t), t ≥ 0.
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Proof. Using the conditions in the statement of the lemma, we have for the
perturbation dynamics given by Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) in Section 4 that
dδl,1(t)
dt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δl,1(t))− U
(d)
C2(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δl,1(t))
and
dδl,2(t)
dt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(LC − l
∗
d + δl,2(t))− U
(d)
C2(t)
(LC − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)).
It then follows that
dδl,1(t)
dt
=
dδl,2(t)
dt
, t ≥ 0.
Furthermore, we have by the definition of the perturbation functions in Section 4
that
δl,1(0) = δl,2(0).
Combining these two results, it follows that
δl,1(t) = δl,2(t), t ≥ 0,
Using the same argument as given in the proof for Lemma B.3, we obtain
the following result that characterizes the dynamics of the perturbations δs,1(t)
and δs,2(t).
Lemma B.3. Let the communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. If we have that
U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
dδs,1(t)
dt
=
dδs,2(t)
dt
, t ≥ 0.
and
δs,1(t) = δs,2(t), t ≥ 0.
The next two results provide a condition under which the absolute values
|δl,1(t)| and |δl,2(t)| can not become too large. The first of the two results provides
a condition for the perturbation δl,1(t).
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Lemma B.4. Let the community C1(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in Section 4. If we
have that
2l∗d + δl,1(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≤ 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
, t ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the result by contradiction. To do that, suppose that the result
of the lemma is not true. As by Lemma B.1 we have that the perturbation
function δl,1(t) is continuous in t for t ≥ 0, and by assumption we have
2l∗d + δl,1(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
it then follows that there exists a time t1 > 0 such that
2l∗d + δl,1(t1) = 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
and
dδl,1(t = t1)
dt
> 0. (15)
. Using Lemma A.3, we have for the time t1 that
U
(d)
C1(t1)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t1)) = 0.
Using this result in the definition of the perturbation functions given by Eq. (9)
we obtain that
dδl,1(t = t1)
dt
= −max
{
0, U
(d)
C2(t1)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δl,1(t1))
}
≤ 0.
This leads to a contraction with Eq. (15) which states that
dδl,1(t = t1)
dt
> 0.
It then follows that
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≤ 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
, t ≥ 0,
and we obtain the result of the lemma.
Using the same argument as given to prove Lemma B.4, we obtain the fol-
lowing condition to guarantee that the perturbation δl,2(t) can not become too
large in magnitude.
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Lemma B.5. Let the community C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in Section 4. If we
have that
2l∗d − δl,2(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
2l∗d − δl,2(t) ≤ 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
, t ≥ 0.
Using Lemma B.4 and Lemma B.5, the next result provides a condition for
the utilities obtained by the border agents to always be non-negative.
Lemma B.6. Let the community C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in Sec-
tion 4. If we have that
2l∗d + δl,1(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
and
2l∗d − δl,2(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
U
(s)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
Proof. Using the result of Lemma B.4 and Lemma B.5, we obtain under the
conditions given in the statement of the lemma
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≤ 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
, t ≥ 0
and
2l∗d − δl,2(t) ≤ 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
, t ≥ 0.
Using the result of Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4, we obtain in this case for all
agents y ∈ C1d(t) that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(y) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
Stable Community Structures and Social Exclusion 21
and for all agents y ∈ C2d(t) that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(y) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
Using this result in the definition of the utility functions U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) and U
(s)
C1(t)
(y),
we obtain for all agents y ∈ C1s (t) that
U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and for all agents y ∈ C2d(t) that
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
In particular, these results imply that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
U
(s)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
The result of the lemma then follows.
Lemma B.7. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2,
and let the corresponding community C1(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in Section 4. If
we have that
2l∗d < 2l
∗
d + δl,1(0) < 2L
∗
C
and
2l∗d < 2l
∗
d − δl,2(0) < 2L
∗
C ,
then we have that
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,1(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,1(0), t ≥ 0,
and
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d − δl,2(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,2(0), t ≥ 0.
Proof. Using Lemma A.3, if for time t ≥ 0 we have that
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≥ 2l
∗
d = 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we obtain that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≤ 0.
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Using this result in the definition of the perturbation function δl,1(t) given by
Eq. (9), if for time t ≥ 0 we have that
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≥ 2l
∗
d,
then we obtain that
dδl,1(t)
dt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t))−max
{
0, U
(d)
C2(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δl,1(t))
}
≤ 0.
This implies that
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,1(0) < 2L
∗
C , t ≥ 0. (16)
Using the same argument we have that if
2l∗d < 2l
∗
d − δl,2(0) < 2L
∗
C ,
then we obtain that
2l∗d − δl,2(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,2(0) < 2L
∗
C , t ≥ 0. (17)
Therefore, it remains to show that
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,1(t), t ≥ 0,
and
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d − δl,2(t), t ≥ 0.
Using Eq. (16) and (17), as well as Lemma A.2, in the definition of the utility
function U
(d)
C2(t)
(y), we obtain that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(−LC + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) < 0, t ≥ 0.
Using Eq. (9) in Section 4, it then follows that
dδl,1(t)
dt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)), t ≥ 0.
Moreover by Lemma A.3, if for time t ≥ 0 we have that
2l∗d + δl,1(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d,
then we obtain that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0.
Combining the two results above, we obtain that if
2l∗d < 2l
∗
d + δl,1(0) < 2L
∗
C ,
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then we have that
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
Using the same argument we can show that if
2l∗d < 2l
∗
d − δl,1(0) < 2L
∗
C ,
then we obtain that
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d − δl,2(t), t ≥ 0.
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next result characterizes the perturbation functions for the case where
the Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , L
∗
C) is as given by Proposition 3.1.
Lemma B.8. Let C(L∗C , L
∗
C) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.1
with
L∗C <
f0
a
−
c
ag0
,
and let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. Furthermore, let
K = EpEq
[
− 2c+ 2f0g0 − 2L
∗
Cag0
]
and
M = EpEq
[
2L∗Cag0
]
.
Then the following is true. If
2l∗d + δl,1(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
and
2l∗d − δl,2(0) < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
then we have that
δl,1(t) = δl,2(t) = δd(t), t ≥ 0,
and
δs,1(t) = δs,2(t) = δs(t), t ≥ 0,
as well as
δl,1(t)
δt
=
δl,2(t)
δt
=
δd(t)
δt
= Kδs(t)−Mδd(t), t ≥ 0,
and
δs,1(t)
δt
=
δs,2(t)
δt
=
δs(t)
δt
= Kδd(t), t ≥ 0.
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Proof. Using the result of Lemma B.6, we obtain under the conditions given in
the statement of the lemma that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
U
(s)
C1(t)
(−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t)) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
Combining this result with Lemma B.2 we obtain that
dδl,1(t)
dt
=
dδl,2(t)
dt
=
dδd(t)
dt
, t ≥ 0.
and
δl,1(t) = δl,2(t) = δd(t), t ≥ 0.
Similarly, using the of Lemma B.2 we obtain that
dδs,1(t)
dt
=
dδs,2(t)
dt
=
dδs(t)
dt
, t ≥ 0.
and
δs,1(t) = δs,2(t) = δs(t), t ≥ 0.
Finally, using the result of Lemma A.2 which characterizes the content that
agents in the sets C1s (t) and C
2
s (t), we obtain that
U
(d)
C1(t)
(−L∗C+l
∗
d+δd(t)) = EpEq(2L
∗
C+δs(t))
[
g0
(
f0 − a
[
L∗C +
δd(t)
2
])
− c
]
≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(d)
C2(t)
(L∗C−l
∗
d+δd(t)) = EpEq(2L
∗
C−δs(t))
[
g0
(
f0 − a
[
L∗C −
δd(t)
2
])
− c
]
≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
Using these equation in the dynamics of the perturbation δl,1(t) and δs,1(t) given
by Eq. (9) - Eq. (12), we obtain that
dδd(t)
dt
= EpEq
[(
− 2c+ 2f0g0 − 2L
∗
Cag0
)
δs(t)− 2L
∗
Cag0δd(t)
]
, t ≥ 0.
Setting
K = EpEq
[
− 2c+ 2f0g0 − 2L
∗
Cag0
]
and
M = EpEq
[
2L∗Cag0
]
,
Stable Community Structures and Social Exclusion 25
we then obtain that
dδd(t)
dt
=
[
Kδs(t)−Mδd(t)
]
, t ≥ 0.
Similarly, we obtain that
U
(s)
C1
(δs(t)) = EpEq(2L
∗
C+δd(t))
[
g0
(
4f0 − a [2L
∗
C + δd(t)]
4
− c
)]
≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2
(δs(t)) = EpEq(2L
∗
C−δd(t))
[
g0
(
4f0 − a [2L
∗
C − δd(t)]
4
− c
)]
≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
dδs(t)
dt
= EpEq
(
− 2c+ 2f0g0 − 2L
∗
Cag0
)
δd(t), t ≥ 0.
Using the definitions for K as given above, we can re-write this equation as
dδs(t)
dt
= Kδd(t), t ≥ 0.
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next result characterizes the perturbation functions δs,1(t) and δs,2(t)
for the case where the Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) is as given by Proposition 3.2.
Lemma B.9. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2,
and let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. If we have that
U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,1(t)) > 0, t ≥ 0,
and
U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,2(t)) > 0, t ≥ 0,
as well as
−2l∗d < δl,1(t) < 2
[
f0
a
− l∗d
]
, t ≥ 0,
and
2l∗d > δl,2(t) > −2
[
f0
a
− l∗d
]
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that∣∣∣∣δs,1(t)δt
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣δs,2(t)δt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ EpEqag0 14
[
δ2l,1(t) + δ
2
l,2(t)
]
.
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Proof. Note that if for a given time t, t ≥ 0, we have
−2l∗d < δl,1(t) ≤ 0,
then we have from Lemma A.2 that
U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,1(t)) = U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,2(t)) = EpEq
[
g0f0 − c
]
l∗d (18)
−ag0
(
δl,1(t)
2
)2
.
Similarly, if for a given time t, t ≥ 0 we have
0 < δl,1(t) < 2
[
f0
a
− l∗d
]
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,1(t)) = U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,2(t)) = EpEq
[
g0f0 − c
]
l∗d (19)
−ag0
(
δl,1(t)
2
)2
.
Using the same argument, if for a given time t, t ≥ 0 we have
−2
[
f0
a
− l∗d
]
< δl,2(t) < 2l
∗
d,
then we have that
U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,2(t)) = U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,1(t)) = EpEq
[
g0f0 − c
]
l∗d (20)
−ag0
(
δl,2(t)
2
)2
.
As by assumption we have that
U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,1(t)) = U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,2(t)) > 0,
and
U
(s)
C2t)
(δs,1(t)) = U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,2(t)) > 0,
it follows that
dδs,1(t)
dt
= U
(s)
C1(t)
(δs,1(t))− U
(s)
C2(t)
(δs,1(t)) = −
dδs,2(t)
dt
.
Combining this result with Eq. (18) - (20), we obtain that∣∣∣U (s)C1(t)(δs,1(t))− U (s)C2(t)(δs,1(t))
∣∣∣ ≤ EpEqag0 1
4
[
δ2l,1(t) + δ
2
l,2(t)
]
,
and ∣∣∣∣δs,1(t)δt
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣δs,2(t)δt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ EpEqag0 14
[
δ2l,1(t) + δ
2
l,2(t)
]
.
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C Sufficient Condition for a Neutral-Stable Equilibrium
The next result provides a condition for Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) as given by
Proposition 3.2 to be neutral-stable.
Lemma C.1. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2.
Furthermore let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as
defined in Section 4. Then the following is true. If
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0,
then we have that
lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) = lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) > 0, y ∈ C1s ∪ C
2
s .
Proof. By Lemma A.2 we have that the optimal content to produce in commu-
nity C1(t) is the same for all agents y ∈ C
1
s ∪C
2
s , and given by
x∗1(y, t) = −L
∗
C +
δl,1(t)
2
.
Similarly, the optimal content to produce in community C2(t) is the same for all
agents y ∈ C1s ∪C
2
s , and given by
x∗2(y, t) = L
∗
C −
δl,1(t)
2
.
If we have that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0,
then it follows
lim
t→∞
x∗1(y, t) = −L
∗
C
and
lim
t→∞
x∗2(y, t) = L
∗
C .
As by Assumption 1 we have that
g(x) = g0, x ≥ 0,
it follows that for all agents y ∈ C1s ∪ C
2
s we have that
lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) = = EpEq
∫
z∈C1
d
[
g0f(| − L
∗
C − z|)− c
]
dz
= EpEq
∫ −L∗C+l∗d
−L∗
C
−l∗
d
[
g0f(| − L
∗
C − z|)− c
]
dz
= EpEq
∫ −L∗C+l∗d
−L∗
C
−l∗
d
[
g0f(|L
∗
C + z|)− c
]
dz
= EpEq
∫ L∗C+l∗d
L∗
C
−l∗
d
[
g0f(|L
∗
C − z|)− c
]
dz
= lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y).
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Using this result, we obtain that
lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) = lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y).
As the Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) is as given by Proposition 3.2, we have that
l∗d =
f0
a
−
c
ag0
< L∗C .
Furthermore, we have by Assumption 1 that
f(x) = max{0, f0 − ax},
where f0 ∈ (0, 1] and a > 0. Combining these two results, we obtain that
f(0) = f0
and
f(l∗d) =
c
g0
.
It then follow that
lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C1(t)
(y) = EpEq
∫ −L∗C+l∗d
−L∗
C
−l∗
d
[
g0f(| − L
∗
C − z|)− c
]
dz = EpEql
∗
d
[
f0g0 − c
]
.
As by Assumption 1 we have that
f0g0 − c > 0,
we obtain that
lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) = lim
t→∞
U
(s)
C2(t)
(y) > 0.
The result of the lemma then follows.
Next we provide two conditions under which we have for Nash equilibrium
C(L∗C , l
∗
d) as given by Proposition 3.2 that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = 0.
The first result considers the case where
δl,1(0) < 0.
Lemma C.2. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2,
and let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. Furthermore, let
δ = L∗C − l
∗
d
and
B0 =
EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
.
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Then the following is true. If
−δ < δl,1(0) < 0
and
−δ < δl,2(0),
as well as
|δs,1(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
−δB0e
−B0t ≤ δl,1(t) ≤ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = 0.
Proof. Note that for a Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) as given by Proposition 3.2
we have that
0 < l∗d < L
∗
C
and
l∗d =
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
.
It then follows that
δ = L∗C − l
∗
d > 0.
Furthermore, if we have that
δl,1(0) < 0,
then we obtain that
2l∗d + δl,1(0) < 2l
∗
d = 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
.
From Lemma B.6 we then have that
2l∗d − δl,1(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d = 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
, t ≥ 0, (21)
and it follows that
δl,1(t) ≤ 0, t ≥ 0. (22)
Therefore in order to prove the result of the lemma, it remains to show that
under the conditions given in the lemma we have that
−δB0e
−B0t ≤ δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
Using the assumption that
−δ < δl,2(0),
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we have from Lemma B.7 that
−δ = −(L∗C − l
∗
d) < δl,2(0) ≤ δl,2(t), t ≥ 0.
It then follows that
L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t) > 0, t ≥ 0. (23)
Furthermore as by Eq. (22) we have that
δl,1(t) ≤ 0, t ≥ 0,
it follows that
−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t) ≤ −L
∗
C + l
∗
d. (24)
Combining Eq. (24) and (23) with LemmaA.2 and A.4, we obtain that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(
− L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)
)
< 0.
Combining this result with Eq. (22), we obtain that
δl,1(t)
δt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(
−L∗C+l
∗
d+δl,1(t)
)
= −
1
2
EpEq
[
2L∗C+δs,1(t)
]
ag0δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
As from Eq. (22) we have that
δl,1(t) ≤ 0, t ≥ 0,
and by assumption we have that
|δs,1(t)| < L
∗
C , t ≥ 0,
it follows that
δl,1(t)
δt
≥
−EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
δl,1(t) > 0, t ≥ 0.
Recall that B0 is given by
B0 =
EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
,
and we have
δl,1(t)
δt
≥ −B0δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
The solution to this differential equation with the initial condition
δl,1(0) < 0
is given by
δl,1(t) ≥ δl,1(0)e
−B0t, t ≥ 0.
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As by assumption we have that
−δ < δl,1(0) < 0,
it follows that
−δe−B0t ≤ δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
As by Eq. (22) we have that
δl,1(t) ≤ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
−δe−B0t = 0,
the result of the lemma then follows.
The next result provides a condition under which we have for Nash equilib-
rium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) as given by Proposition 3.2 that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = 0,
for the case where
δl,1(0) > 0.
Lemma C.3. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2,
and let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. Furthermore, let
δ = L∗C − l
∗
d.
Then the following is true. If
0 < δl,1(0) < min
{
δ, 2
[
f0
a
− l∗d
]}
,
and
0 < δl,2(0),
as well as
|δs,1(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
δl,1(t) ≤ δB0e
−B0t, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = 0.
Proof. Note that for a Nash equilibrium C(L∗C , l
∗
d) as given by Proposition 3.2
we have that
0 < l∗d < L
∗
C
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and
l∗d =
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
.
It then follows that
δ = L∗C − l
∗
d > 0.
Furthermore, if we have that
0 < δl,1(0) < δ,
then we obtain that
2l∗d < l
∗
d + δl,1(0) < 2L
∗
C .
From Lemma B.7, we then have that
2l∗d ≤ 2l
∗
d − δl,1(t) ≤ 2l
∗
d + δl,1(0), t ≥ 0, (25)
and it follows that
δl,1(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0. (26)
Therefore in order to prove the result of the lemma, it remains to show that
under the conditions given in the lemma we have that
δl,1(t) < δB0e
−B0t, t ≥ 0.
Using the assumption that
−δ < δl,2(0),
we have from Lemma B.7 that
−δ = −(L∗C − l
∗
d) < δl,2(t), t ≥ 0.
It then follows that
L∗C − l
∗
d + δl,2(t) > 0, t ≥ 0. (27)
Furthermore as by Eq. (26) we have that
δl,1(t) < δ = L
∗
C − l
∗
d, t ≥ 0,
it follows that
−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t) ≤ 0. (28)
Combining Eq. (28) and (27) with LemmaA.2 and A.4, we obtain that
U
(d)
C2(t)
(
− L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)
)
< 0.
Combining this result with Eq. (22), we obtain that
δl,1(t)
δt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(
− L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(t)
)
.
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As by assumption we have that
δl,1(0) < 2
[f0
a
− l∗d
]
,
and hence by Lemma B.7 we have
δl,1(t) < 2
[f0
a
− l∗d
]
, t ≥ 0,
it follows that
δl,1(t)
δt
= U
(d)
C1(t)
(
−L∗C+l
∗
d+δl,1(t)
)
= −
1
2
EpEq
[
2L∗C+δs,1(t)
]
ag0δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
As we have from Eq. (26) we have that
δl,1(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and by assumption we have that
|δs,1(t)| < L
∗
C , t ≥ 0,
it follows that
δl,1(t)
δt
≤
−EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
δl,1(t) < 0, t ≥ 0.
Recall that B0 is given by
B0 =
EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
,
and we have
δl,1(t)
δt
≤ −B0δl,1(t), t ≥ 0.
The solution to this differential equation with the initial condition
δl,1(0) > 0
is given by
δl,1(t) ≤ δl,1(0)e
−B0t, t ≥ 0.
As by assumption we have that
0 < δl,1(0) < δ,
it follows that
δl,1(t) < δe
−B0t, t ≥ 0.
As by Eq. (26) we have that
δl,1(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
−δe−B0t = 0,
the result of the lemma then follows.
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Using the same argument as given in the proof of Lemma C.2 and Lemma C.3,
we obtain the following two results.
Lemma C.4. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2,
and let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. Furthermore, let
δ = L∗C − l
∗
d
and
B0 =
EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
.
Then the following is true. If
−δ < δl,2(0) < 0
and
0 < δl,1(0) < δ,
as well as
|δs,1(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
−δB0e
−B0t ≤ δl,2(t) ≤ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0.
Lemma C.5. Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 3.2,
and let the corresponding communities C1(t) and C2(t), t ≥ 0, be as defined in
Section 4. Furthermore, let
δ = L∗C − l
∗
d
and
B0 =
EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
.
Then the following is true. If
0 < δl,2(0) < δ
and
0 < δl,1(0) < δ,
as well as
|δs,1(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
δB0e
−B0t ≥ δl,2(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = 0.
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D Proof of Proposition 5.1
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 5.1. Let C(L∗C , L
∗
C) be a Nash equilibrium
as given in Proposition 5.1, and we have that
L∗C <
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
.
We then show that for every δ > 0, there exist initial perturbations δl,1(0),
δl,2(0), δs,1(0), and δs,2(0), such that
0 < |δl,1(0)|, |δl,2(0)|, |δs,1(0)|, |δs,2(0)| < δ,
such that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) > 0
and
lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) > 0,
as well as
lim
t→∞
δs,1(t) > 0
and
lim
t→∞
δs,2(t) > 0.
Using Definition 4.1 and 4.2, these results imply that C(L∗C , L
∗
C) is neither a
stable, or a neutral-stable, Nash equilibrium.
Let δ > 0 be such that
2L∗C + δ < 2
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
.
Let the constants K and M be as given in Lemma B.8. As by assumption
we have that
L∗C <
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
,
it follows that
K = EpEq
[
− 2c+ 2f0g0 − 2L
∗
Cag0
]
> 0.
Furthermore, by definition we have that
M = EpEq
[
2L∗Cag0
]
> 0.
Using these definitions, let ǫd, 0 < ǫd < δ, and ǫs, 0 < ǫs < δ, be such that[
Kǫs −Mǫd
]
> 0. (29)
Note that such a ǫd and ǫs can always be obtained by making ǫd small enough.
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Using these definitions, let the initial conditions
δl,1(0) = δl,2(0) = δd(0)
and
δs,1(0) = δs,2(0) = δs(0),
be such that
0 < ǫd < δd(0) < δ
and
0 < ǫs < δs(0) < δ.
Under these initial conditions, we have by Lemma B.8 that
δl,1(t) = δl,2(t) = δd(t), t ≥ 0,
and
δs,1(t) = δs,2(t) = δs(t), t ≥ 0,
as well as
dδl,1(t)
δt
=
dδl,2(t)
δt
=
dδd(t)
δt
= Kδs(t)−Mδd(t), t ≥ 0, (30)
and
dδs,1(t)
δt
=
dδs,2(t)
δt
=
dδs(t)
δt
= Kδd(t), t ≥ 0. (31)
We then prove the result of the proposition as follows. Suppose that
lim
t→∞
δd(t) = 0.
As by by assumption we have that
δd(0) > ǫd
and by Lemma B.1 the function δd(t) is continuous in t for t ≥ 0, we then have
for this case that there exists a time t1 > 0 such that
δd(t1) = ǫd
and
δd(t) > ǫd, 0 ≤ t < t1,
as well as
dδd(t1)
dt
< 0. (32)
In the following we show that this cannot be the case.
Note that the following is true for this time t1. As we have that
δd(t) ≥ ǫd > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ t1,
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it follows that from Eq. (31) that
dδs(t)
dt
> 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ t1,
and we obtain that
δs(t1) > δs(0) > ǫs.
Using this result, it follows from Eq. (29) and Eq. (30) that
dδd(t1)
dt
> 0.
However this result contradicts Eq. 32 which states that if
lim
t→∞
δd(t) = 0,
there exists a time t1 > 0 such that
δd(t1) = ǫd
and
dδd(t1)
dt
< 0.
It then follows that we have that
δd(t) ≥ ǫd, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δd(t) ≥ ǫd.
Moreover, for time t ≥ 0 such that
δd(t) ≥ ǫd > 0
we have that
dδs(t)
dt
> 0.
Using the above result that
δd(t) ≥ ǫd, t ≥ 0,
it then follows that
δs(t) ≥ δs(0) > ǫs > 0, t ≥ 0,
and
lim
t→∞
δs(t) ≥ δs(0) > ǫs > 0.
This establishes the result of the proposition.
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E Proof of Proposition 5.2
Let C(L∗C , l
∗
d) be a Nash equilibrium with
l∗d =
(
f0
a
−
c
ag0
)
< L∗C
as given in Proposition 5.2. We then show that there exists a δ > 0, such that if
for initial perturbations δl,1(0), δl,2(0), δs,1(0), and δs,2(0), we have
0 < |δl,1(0)|, |δl,2(0)|, |δs,1(0)|, |δs,2(0)| < δ,
then we have that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0.
Using Lemma C.1, this result implies that
lim
t→∞
U
(d)
C1(t)
(y) = lim
t→∞
U
(d)
C2(t)
(y) > 0, y ∈ C1d ∪C
2
d ,
and by Definition 4.2 C(L∗C , l
∗
d) is a neutral-stable Nash equilibrium.
To prove that there exists a δ > 0, such that if for initial perturbations δl,1(0),
δl,2(0), δs,1(0), and δs,2(0), we have
0 < |δl,1(0)|, |δl,2(0)|, |δs,1(0)|, |δs,2(0)| < δ,
then we have that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0,
we proceed as follows. Let
B0 =
EpEqL
∗
Cag0
2
,
and let δ be such that
0 < δ < min
{
1,
L∗c − l
∗
d
2
,
1
2
[
f0
a
− l∗d
]
,
L∗C
4
,
L∗CB0
EpEqag0δ
}
.
Note that for this definition of δ and for
|δl,1(0)| < δ,
we have that
−L∗C + l
∗
d + δl,1(0) ≤ −
L∗c − l
∗
d
2
,
and
δl,1(0) < L
∗
c − l
∗
d. (33)
Using the same argument, we obtain that
−
(
L∗c − l
∗
d
)
< δl,2(0). (34)
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Using Lemma C.2 - C.5 it then follows that if we have that
|δs,2(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
and
|δs,2(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we obtain that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0.
Therefore in order to prove the result, it remains to show that we indeed
have that
|δs,1(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0
and
|δs,2(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0.
We first consider the perturbation δs,1(t). From Eq. (33) and (34), we have
that
δl,1(0) < L
∗
c − l
∗
d
and
−
(
L∗c − l
∗
d
)
< δl,2(0),
and by construction we have that
|δl,1(0)|, |δl,2(0)| < δ.
Using Lemma C.2 - C.5, we then obtain that if
|δs,1(t)|, |δs,2(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that
|δl,1(t)|, |δl,2(t)| < δe
−B0t, t ≥ 0.
Combining this result with Lemma B.9, we obtain that if
|δs,1(t)|, |δs,2(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0,
then we have that ∣∣∣∣δs,1(t)δt
∣∣∣∣ < EpEq[ag02
]
δ2e−2B0t.
As by construction we have that
δ < 1,
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it follows that
δ2 < δ,
and we obtain in this case that∣∣∣∣δs,1(t)δt
∣∣∣∣ < EpEq[ag02
]
δe−2B0t.
Using this result, we obtain that the change in perturbation δs,1(t) is bounded
by
|δs,1(t = 0)− δs,1(t)| <
EpEqag0δ
4B0
t ≥ 0.
As by construction we have that
|δs,1(t = 0)| < δ
and
δ < min
{
L∗C
4
,
L∗CB0
EpEqag0δ
}
,
it then follows that we indeed have that
|δs,1(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0.
Using the same argument, we can show that we also have that
|δs,2(t)| <
L∗C
2
, t ≥ 0.
This completes the proof to show that
lim
t→∞
δl,1(t) = lim
t→∞
δl,2(t) = 0.
